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Abstract: The use of collective action clauses (CACs) in public bonds has
received significant attention in academic and policy circles in recent years.
While the existing literature suggests that market participants in sovereign and
corporate bond markets often opt to include CACs when allowed under the
applicable governing law, whether CACs create or destroy economic value is an
open question. Notably, the studies examining the value of CACs have largely
focused on sovereign bonds, devoting minor attention to public corporate debt, a
gap in the literature which this Article addresses.
This Article assesses the value of CACs by exploiting a recent reform in the legal
regime governing CACs in Chile, wherein previously banned CACs are now
allowed in public corporate debt. Interest rate spreads for bonds issued with a
CAC after the reform are on average 20% lower than those of bonds that do not
include such clauses. The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates to annual
savings of over U.S. $415,000, which add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million
during the course of the life of the average bond. This finding is robust to
controlling for various issuer characteristics and is replicated in specifications
that include issuer fixed effects, confirming that these results are not driven by
unobservable issuer characteristics. The analyses also suggest that including a
CAC can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their creditworthiness, a
result contrary to earlier studies in this area.
These findings provide a positive assessment of the recent legal reforms in Chile
and, most importantly, strengthen the case for repealing the longstanding
prohibition on CACs in public corporate debt issued under U.S. law. The
experience in Chile suggests that repealing this ban on CACs would result in
lower interest rates, substantially reducing the cost of capital for U.S.
corporations, the vast majority of which primarily rely on the bond markets to
conduct their financing activities.

* Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I want to thank Brian Broughman, Michael Guttentag,
Therese Maynard, Elizabeth Pollman, Mark Roe, Kathryn Spier, Matías Zegers and participants at the
2015 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies and the 2015 Conference of the Latin American and
Iberian Law and Economics Association for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors are
my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of collective action clauses (CACs) in public bonds has
received considerable attention in academic, practitioner and policy circles
in recent years.1 In Europe, the Greek debt crisis highlighted the important
role that CACs can play in the restructuring of sovereign debt.2 A series of
similar crises in the sovereign debt markets during the mid and late 1990’s
spurred the adoption of CACs in sovereign debt governed by New York
law.3 These experiences in the sovereign debt markets also left their mark in
the corporate bond markets. Countries that previously banned the use of
CACs in corporate debt, such as Chile and Germany, have recently enacted
reforms to allow the inclusion of these clauses, moves that have been
welcomed by market participants.4 In the United States, one of the few
1

See, e.g., Marc M. Rossell, Can Collective Action Clauses Migrate to the Latam Corporate Bond
Market?, 18 LATIN AM. L. & BUS. R., no. 12, Dec. 2010, at 1; W. Mark C. Weidermaier & Mitu Gulati,
A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 52–55 (2013); Elaine Moore,
IMF Recommends Overhaul of Sovereign Bonds, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:23 PM),
http://on.ft.com/1sZIpcI.
2
See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An
Autopsy
(Peterson
Inst.
For
Int’l
Econ.
Working
Paper
No.
13-8,
2013),
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp13-8.pdf.
3
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the German reform) and notes 80–83
and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean reform).
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countries that still ban the use of CACs in corporate debt, the prohibition of
CACs has long been the subject of continuous scrutiny.5
A CAC allows a qualifying majority of bondholders to approve
changes to the original core terms of an outstanding bond issue (such as the
interest rate, maturity and principal amount) in a manner that binds all
bondholders.6 One of the economic rationales for including such a provision
is to facilitate renegotiations between the issuer and bondholders in the
event that the issuer later needs to restructure its debt in order to manage
financial distress. 7 In such an event, individual creditors may find it in their
own interest not to participate in a proposed restructuring, while hoping that
a sufficient number of their fellow creditors will do so, thus ensuring that
the issuer survives and allowing the holdout creditor to receive payment of
her claim in full.8 The problem, of course, is that if enough creditors follow
such a strategy, the proposed workout will fail. 9 By making a workout
proposal approved by a qualified majority of bondholders binding on
dissenting bondholders, CACs serve as an ex-ante contractual solution to
this holdout problem.10
While the existing evidence suggests that market participants in both
sovereign and corporate bond markets often opt to include CACs when
allowed to do so, the question of whether such provisions create or destroy
economic value is still an open one.11 Existing research examining this
question has been inconclusive: while some studies have found that the
inclusion of CACs is associated with lower interest rates, other studies have
found no such relationship or have found such relationship to exist only for
a subset of issuers. Moreover, the vast majority of these studies suffer a key
methodological flaw—they do not review the underlying contractual
documents to determine the presence of a CAC, relying instead on the
governing law of the instrument as a proxy.12 In addition, these studies have
largely focused on sovereign debt, devoting little to no attention to
corporate bonds.13
This Article provides an empirical assessment of the value of CACs by
examining the recent experience in the Chilean corporate bond market.14
Chile previously had a legal regime similar to that which currently exists in
the United States, wherein CACs were effectively banned in most corporate
5

See infra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
8
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
9
See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Part III.A.
6
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bond issues.15 In 2007, Chilean law was reformed to enable contracting
parties to include CACs in bond indentures and to select the qualifying
majority that may authorize changes to the core terms, provided that such
majority is greater than 75% of the aggregate principal amount of the bonds
outstanding.16 These reforms to Chile’s legal regime governing CACs
present a unique opportunity to assess the economic value of CACs in the
context of corporate debt.
To conduct my analyses, I constructed a hand-collected dataset of 195
Chilean corporate bonds issued between January 1, 2005 and December 31,
2013.17 For each issue I reviewed the prospectus and corresponding
indenture to gather information about the issuer, the offering, and the
contractual terms governing the bonds and further complemented this data
with financial information filed by issuers with Chilean regulatory bodies.
Overall, the results indicate that the Chilean legal reform has yielded
measurable economic benefits. Bonds issued with a CAC after the reform
have spreads that are, on average, 20% lower than those bond issues that do
not include such clauses.18 The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates
to annual interest savings of over U.S. $415,000 for the average bond
offering (approximately U.S. $145 million in aggregate principal amount)
which, over the course of fourteen years (the average maturity in the
sample), add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million. This main result is
robust to including controls for an issuer’s size, credit rating, capital
structure, as well as the bond issue’s offering size, year, and maturity.19
Specifications that include issuer fixed effects confirm that these results are
not driven by unobservable variables.20 In addition, the analyses suggest
that adopting a CAC can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their
credit rating, a result contrary to earlier studies in this area.21
The existence of a negative correlation between the inclusion of a
CAC and the interest rate of the corresponding bond indicates that issuers
and investors are adopting these clauses in transactions where their
inclusion results in optimal, more efficient arrangements that create
economic value. Such a finding informs a number of ongoing debates
surrounding the use of CACs. First, it provides a positive assessment of the
recent legal reforms in Chile and Germany, which repealed statutory
prohibitions on the use of CACs in corporate debt. More generally, the
15

See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
17
For a description of the dataset see infra Part III.B.
18
See infra Part IV.A.1.
19
See infra Part IV.A.1. In addition, the restrictive financial covenants contained in the indentures
governing bonds that contain CACs and those that do not contain CACs are strikingly similar. See infra
Part IV.A.3.
20
See infra Part IV.A.2.
21
See infra Part IV.B.
16
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results suggest that corporate issuers and investors should strongly consider
including CACs in the instruments governing their bonds when allowed to
do so by applicable law and providing additional support for the inclusion
of CACs in sovereign debt, an issue that has recently received much
attention.22
From a policy perspective, the experience in Chile strengthens the case
for repealing the longstanding ban on CACs in public corporate debt issued
under U.S. law.23 The critical role played by the bond market for corporate
U.S. issuers cannot be understated—on average, corporations issue over $1
trillion in bonds each year, seven times the amount raised by these entities
through the issuance of common stock.24 Repealing the ban on CACs would
result in lower interest rates, thereby reducing the cost of capital for issuers,
the vast majority of which primarily rely on the bond markets to conduct
their financing activities.25
22

In Europe, for example, under the terms of the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, all
sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 must include a CAC. See Christian Hofmann, SovereignDebt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 385,
393 (2014).
23
See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
24
For the years 2012 through 2014, U.S. corporations issued approximately $3.9 trillion in bonds,
seven times the amount of stock issued by these entities. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES.
SYS,.New
Security
Issues,
U.S.
Corporations,
(Dec.
28,
2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/corpsecure20151231.htm.
25
There are various caveats to transplanting lessons drawn from the experience in Chile to the
United States given the distinguishing features in the legal and institutional frameworks that govern the
corporate bond markets in these two countries. It is not clear, however, how these differing features
would affect the value of including a CAC. For example, one may expect the effectiveness and
efficiency of bankruptcy laws to affect parties’ preferences regarding the inclusion of a CAC, as well as
the values of these clauses. Cross-country surveys and studies have found the Chilean bankruptcy
system to be less efficient than the U.S. system, ranking the bankruptcy system of Chile at 102,
respectively, while the United States is ranked at 17. See World Bank Group, Resolving Insolvency,
DOING BUSINESS (June 2015), http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency.
In fact, in order to improve the efficiency of its bankruptcy system, Chile recently enacted a new
insolvency law that became effective on October 2014. Law No. 20720, Octubre 10, 2014, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). For a description of Law No. 20720, see Pedro A. Jimenez, Rodolfo Pittaluga
Jr. & Pablo Herrera, Chile’s New Insolvency Law: Restructured for Corporate Restructurings, INSOL
INT’L
SPECIAL
REPORT
(Oct.
2014),
https://www.insol.org/_files/TechnicalSeries/Special%20Reports/Special%20Report%20on%20Chile%2
0-%2026%20September%202014.pdf. The fact that the Chilean bankruptcy system is less efficient than
the U.S. system suggests that avoiding bankruptcy and its related costs (one of the benefits associated
with CACs) should be more valuable in Chile than in the United States. See infra Part IV.A Another
distinguishing feature can be the size and depth of the corporate bond markets. Less liquid capital
markets in developing economies may be characterized by higher concentrations of bond ownership.
And if ownership concentration is too high, then a single bondholder could in effect possess a veto
power, thus frustrating the purpose of a CAC. This is probably not a major concern in Chile, where
qualifying majorities in CACs have been set by parties at 75%, thus making a 25% ownership of the
entire bond issue necessary to have such a veto power. See infra note 102. The fact that Chilean
corporate bonds may be characterized by higher levels of ownership concentration than those bonds
issued by U.S. companies, suggests that the value of a CAC (which facilitate coordination among
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of the
nature of CACs and the reasons why contracting parties may or may not
choose to adopt these in their agreements. Part III provides an overview of
the Chilean legal framework governing the use of CACs and the recent
reforms. A description of the data and the empirical analyses are presented
in Part IV. Part V discusses the general implications of these findings and
concludes.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CACS
A. Financial Distress and CACs
When an issuer faces financial distress and is unable to meet its debt
obligations, an orderly restructuring of its outstanding liabilities may
become necessary to avoid a default. Under these circumstances, a speedy
and efficient restructuring process better serves issuers and their investors.
For corporate issuers, a country’s bankruptcy system often provides a lastresort court-administered framework for firms to restructure their debt and
continue their operations.26 In general, reorganizations of major public
companies in bankruptcy court entail expensive and lengthy proceedings,
which may, in some cases, exacerbate the costs of financial distress and
destroy firm value.27 The general drawbacks and inefficiencies associated
with bankruptcy proceedings have been extensively examined in academic
literature.28
dispersed investors) is likely to be lower in Chile than in the United States. See infra Part IV.A
26
In the United States, Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides such a court-administered
framework. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1993). In
Chile, Law No. 20720 provides the framework for that country’s bankruptcy regime. See supra note 25.
27
Estimates of the average length of bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in the United States
range from fourteen to twenty-nine months. See, e.g., Vicki L. Bogan & Chad M. Sandler, Are Firms on
the Right Page with Chapter 11? An Analysis of Firm Choices that Contribute to Post-Bankruptcy
Survival, 19 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 609, 612 (2012) (providing an estimate of between 14 and 16
months); Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1270 (2006) (providing an estimate of between twentyeight and twenty-nine months); Diane K. Denis & Kimberly J. Rodgers, Chapter 11: Duration, Outcome
and Post-Reorganization Performance, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 101, 105 (2007)
(providing an estimate of between eighteen and twenty-two months). Estimates of direct, court declared
expenses, such as professional legal costs, range from 1.4% to 1.9% of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy
assets. See, e.g., Bris et. al, supra at 1279 (providing an estimate of 1.9%); Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph
W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2004) (providing an estimate of 1.4%); Stephen J. Lubben, The
Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large
Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 509, 540 (2000) (providing an estimate of 1.8%); Stephen J.
Lubben, Corporate Reorganization and Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 77, 78 (2008)
(providing an estimate of 1.8%).
28
See generally, Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
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Out of court, privately negotiated restructurings offer a less expensive
and more efficient alternative relative to bankruptcy proceedings.29 In a
privately negotiated restructuring, or workout, creditors may extend the
maturity date, forgive interest payments, or exchange their debt claims for
an equity stake in the issuer. To the extent that they are more efficient than
court administered bankruptcy proceedings, workouts can reduce the costs
of financial distress, better preserving the value of a financially distressed,
but otherwise economically viable, company.30 Empirically, the question of
whether such private renegotiations are more efficient and effective than
bankruptcy proceedings is an open one. A number of studies have found
that workout offers from insolvent firms succeed less than 50% of the
time31 and that corporations in serious financial distress appear to enter
STUD. 127 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L. J. 1043 (1992); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain A Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L. J.
153 (2004).
29
See, e.g., Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 347–
48 (1993) (arguing that an out-of-court workout can avoid the costs, delay, and aggravation of a litigious
Chapter 11); Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John and Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restructurings: An
Empirical Study of Private Reorganizations of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 319 (1990)
(positing that the direct costs of Chapter 11 are higher than the direct costs of private negotiation
because the complexity and procedural demands of Chapter 11 increase attorneys’ fees and other
indirect costs such as management time devoted to restructuring); Bettina M. Whyte & Patricia D.
Tilton, Turnarounds: Pursuing a Dual Path, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (1995) (stating that out-ofcourt workouts preferable to Chapter 11 proceedings due to the latter’s cost, image, drain on resources,
and impact on morale, among other factors). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy
Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 415 (1990); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 26, at 677; John
McConnell & Henri Servaes, The Economics of Pre-Packaged Bankruptcy, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 322, 322 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A.
Weiss eds., 1996).
30
See Julian R. Franks and Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in
Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 355 (1994) (“Distressed
exchanges require significantly less time than Chapter 11 reorganizations: a median workout period of
seventeen months, compared with a median of twenty-seven months for Chapter 11 reorganizations.”);
Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts and
Chapter 11, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 308, 319 (J. Bhandari
ed., 1996) (“[d]istressed firms can preserve more of their value by restructuring their debt privately,”
and “the professional fees incurred in exchange offers are about one-tenth of those incurred in a typical
chapter 11 case”); Karen H. Wruck, Financial Distress, Reorganization and Organizational Efficiency,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 436 (1990) (estimating out of pocket costs of restructuring to be about ten times
lower in private workouts relative to bankruptcy proceedings). Even Bankruptcy courts have long
recognized the advantages of private workouts. See, e.g., In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1014–
16 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (listing the advantages of out-of-court workouts relative to bankruptcy
proceedings).
31
See Franks & Touros, supra note 30, at 358 (“These firm recovery rates are significantly smaller
in Chapter 11 reorganizations, a median of 50.9%, than in distressed exchanges, with a median of 80.1%
. indicating that Chapter 11 firms are far less solvent at the end of reorganizations than firms which
restructure their debt privately.”); Robert Gertner & David Sharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the
Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1191 (1991) (showing initial settlement rates of 73 out
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bankruptcy proceedings without attempting a private workout.32
Various hurdles may hinder the ability of issuers and bondholders to
successfully implement a private, out-of-court workout. An efficient
workout proposal may not be successfully implemented if a number of
creditors opportunistically opt to stay out of the workout arrangement.33
Such “holdout” bondholder hopes to profit from the willingness of the nonholdout bondholders to compromise with the issuer, by letting the latter
bear the expense of financing the survival of the issuer (e.g., by extending
the maturity or agreeing to a principal reduction) while demanding it be
paid under the original, more favorable terms.34 Even though each creditor
by itself is not individually critical for the success of a workout, a
substantial number of holdouts may collectively dissuade other creditors
from agreeing to participate in an otherwise efficient and desirable workout
proposal.35 And, if enough bondholders refuse to cooperate in response to
of 156 for junk bond issues); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence
on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356
(1990) (showing private debt restructuring of 50 out of 111 publicly traded companies that experienced
financial distress); Gilson et al., supra note 29, at 326 (showing private restructurings for 80 public
companies out of sample of 169 that experienced financial distress).
32
See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 99, 116 (1983) (noting that none of forty-eight bankrupt
companies analyzed in a study had attempted workouts) and J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy
Bargain: National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 213, 232 (1991) (noting that
workouts are generally not attempted by firms that later file for bankruptcy).
33
See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at 1191 (“[creditors] with small stakes have an
incentive to hold out”); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L. J. 232, 236
(1987) (noting that the buoy-up effect for the holdouts causes workout attempts to fail); see also Gilson,
supra note 31, at 316; Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36. J. L. & ECON. 595,
596 (1993).
34
Consider, as an illustration, a series of bonds with $100 million aggregate principal amount
outstanding which mature in one year. The financially distressed issuer knows that it will be unable to
repay the principal in a timely manner and has proposed a restructuring in which investors would
exchange their existing bonds for a new series of bonds which mature in two years and which will bear a
lower principal amount (e.g., each old bond with $1,000 face value would be exchanged for a new bond
with $800 face value). If the firm is able to restructure at least 90% of the outstanding bonds in this
manner it will survive; however, if the restructuring fails, it will seek bankruptcy protection and
bondholders will receive fifty cents on the dollar (i.e., $500 for each bond worth $1,000 face value).
Given this scenario, a single bondholder that owns $1 million in aggregate principal amount of the
distressed bonds is likely to reject the exchange. If it agrees and the restructuring is successful he
receives $800,000 million repayment in full in a year; while if the restructuring fails it receives
$500,000. However, if he rejects the proposal and the restructuring is successful he receives his $1
million repayment in full; while if the restructuring fails he receives $500,000.
35
This results from the fact that the exchanging bondholders might be made worse off, since they
help assure (and effectively fund) payment to the holdouts. If the resulting subsidy to the nonexchanging bondholders is greater than their savings in avoided bankruptcy costs, each bondholder is
better off refusing to participate, but still better off if all participated. See Roe, supra note 33, at 279.
This problem can be exacerbated by specialized hedge funds that purchase bonds on the secondary
market after the onset of distress at a deep discount and then play non-cooperatively to extract further
concessions from the issuer, thus increasing the potential subsidy to holdouts and endangering the
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the incentives of some to hold out, the workout proposal will ultimately fail.
Including a CAC in the debt agreement between the issuer and
bondholders is one possible ex-ante contractual response to the holdout
problem. CACs allow a qualifying majority of the bondholders (excluding
securities held by the issuer or its insiders) to consent to modifications to
the core provisions of the terms and conditions of a bond issue (such as the
maturity, interest, principal) in a manner that is binding on all bondholders,
including dissenting ones.36 This voting mechanism can help solve the
holdout problem—a qualified majority vote that is binding on all
bondholders, reassures each and every individual bondholder that if it
consents to the terms of a proposed workout, others will not profit at the
consenting bondholder’s expense by holding out.37
By deterring selfish, strategic behavior by holdout investors and
facilitating the coordination of dispersed bondholders willing to participate
in a workout, CACs can lead to welfare gains and enhance value in postdefault scenarios.38 However, even if CACs are indeed optimal conditional
on default, it does not necessarily follow that the adoption of these clauses
maximizes the ex-ante contracting surplus. To the extent they reduce the
costs associated with financial distress, the inclusion of CACs may create
perverse incentives for the issuer, potentially incentivizing it to
opportunistically engage in more risky behavior, which may very well

success of the exchange offer. See John C. Coffee & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207,
1207–14 (1991). In the sovereign debt markets, these hedge funds have played a key role in the ongoing
saga of the restructuring of Argentina’s debt. See Benedict Mander, Cristina Fernández Holds out for
Victory in Debt Battle, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 2:21 PM), http://on.ft.com/1xsSEZA.
36
See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and
Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1054–56 (2002) (describing the holdout problem and noting
that holding out is not possible when a majority of bondholders can bind dissenting bondholders to a
restructuring plan).
37
See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at 1211 (arguing that these types of voting procedure
can help issuers and investors “get around the holdout . problem”); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S.
Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
1357, 1374 (2000) (noting that the inability to bind dissenting creditors which creates holdout problems
in out-of-court workouts is critical difference between out-of-court restructuring and Chapter 11).
38
See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign
Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155–78 (1989); Kenneth M. Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective
Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention, in FIXING FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
230, 233 (Andrew G. Haldane ed., 2004) (arguing that CACs improve welfare relative to unanimous
consent clauses); Kenneth M. Kletzer and Benjamin D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 621–39 (2000). However, it should be noted that this is not necessarily a universally
held view. See, e.g., Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, supra note 33, at 597–99
(arguing that CACs may provide insolvent issuers with an incentive to make the least generous credible
offer, i.e., in which the firm keeps a large share of the gains, leaving creditors with a smaller share than
that implied by the bankruptcy priority order, which may lead to a protracted process of offers and
counteroffers).
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increase the probability of default. 39 Rational investors who are aware of
this moral hazard problem would either demand a unanimous action clause
(UAC), which requires that any modification to the core terms of the bond
issue be approved by all bondholders, or agree to the inclusion of a CAC
together with appropriate compensation for the excess risk in the form of
higher interest rates.40
For the most part, corporate issuers and investors in the United States
are not afforded the flexibility of deciding whether or not to include a CAC
in their indenture agreements. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA),41
which governs public issues of debt in the United States, regulates the
contractual terms that may be incorporated in an indenture agreement,42
including those relating to the amendments of the terms and conditions of
the bonds.43 The TIA requires that modifications of core provisions such as
the principal balance, interest rate, or the schedule of debt repayments be
consented to by each and every single bondholder.44 As a result, CACs
39

See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing
Costs?, 114 ECON. J. 247, 248–49 (2004); Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong
Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J.
INT’L. ECON. 127, 128 (2003).
40
Even “high quality” issuers for which this moral hazard problem is minimal may not be willing
to propose including a CAC because of the possible adverse signaling effect (i.e., “disclosing” a higher
probability of future financial problems and willingness to exploit a CAC mechanism) and the resulting
increase in the interest rate. See Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J.
ECON. 432, 439 (1992) (showing that the signaling effect of bargaining proposals is stronger when the
proposal is made by a more informed party); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness
of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 654–57 (2006) (noting that this effect is likely to be
stronger in cases where an unfamiliar term being proposed and that opting out proposals are even more
suspicious when the default is very common, further weakening the incentive of any party to propose
such deviations); Roe, Voting Prohibition, supra note 33, at 277.
41
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 301–302, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa–77bbb (West 2016). Offerings
exempt under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Rule 144A promulgated
thereunder are not subject to the TIA. Id. § 304(b), § 77ddd(b). In addition, most provisions of the TIA
do not apply to a number of other exempt offerings under the Securities Act, such as Section 3(a)(3)
commercial paper and bonds issued by sovereign governments. Id. § 304(a), § 77ddd(a).
42
In the United States, public debt offerings in excess of $10 million require the use of a trust
indenture, an agreement between the issuer and a trustee representing the bondholder’s interests. Id. §§
304–305, §§ 77ddd–77eee. For a description of the role played by indentures and the types of provisions
contained therein see infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. If the TIA applies to a debt issuance,
the governing indenture must be “qualified” with the SEC before any sales of the securities can be made.
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77fff (West 2016). As part of this qualification
process, various substantive provisions are deemed to be automatically incorporated into the indenture.
Id. § 318(c), § 77rrr(c).
43
Generally, non-substantive amendments may be approved by the holders of a majority of the
outstanding bonds, or, if required under the terms of the indenture, by a higher majority. Id. § 316(a)(1),
§ 77ppp(a)(1). However, they may not choose a lower one. If they do, the indenture will be
automatically qualified as requiring a simple majority. Id. If the indenture is silent on this regard, a
simple majority is sufficient to authorize such binding amendments. Id.
44
Id. § 316(b), § 77ppp(b). This requirement that an indenture may not provide for the amendment

478

36_3_1_BERDEJO FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/16 8:20 PM

Collective Action Clauses
36:469 (2016)

cannot be included in corporate bonds that are publicly issued in the United
States, a prohibition that can lead to inefficient and unnecessary
bankruptcies, exacerbating as a result the costs of financial distress.45 Ex
ante, the higher expected costs associated with financial distress could be
reflected in higher interest rates, which increases the cost of capital for
companies. In response to the higher costs that result from this ban on
CACs, market participants have strategically developed less efficient and
effective alternatives to the privately negotiated workout, such as the exitconsent offer46 and the pre-packaged bankruptcy.47 Motivated in great part
of any core term by means of a vote of a majority (or super majority) of bondholders is a mandatory
rule, which parties cannot agree to modify by a contractual arrangement and that applies despite their
desire to contract around it. Section 316(a)(2) of the TIA provides a limited exception, allowing an
indenture to contain a provision authorizing the holders of not less than 75% in principal amount to
consent on behalf of all holders to the postponement of any interest payment for a period not exceeding
three years from its due date. Amendments to non-core terms must be approved by the holders of a
majority of the outstanding bonds, unless the terms of the indenture, by a higher majority. Id. §
316(a)(1), § 77ppp(a)(1).
45
See Kahan, supra note 36, at 1055–56; Roe, supra note 33, at 233, 250–52 (“[F]inancial stress
creates problems that current bond regulation exacerbates . . By prohibiting a binding vote among
bondholders, the Trust Indenture Act makes a recapitalization more likely to fail than it would otherwise
be.”).
46
In an exchange offer and consent solicitation, the bondholders that agree to the new proposed
core terms consent to an exit amendment stripping certain nonpayment covenants from the governing
indenture prior to exchanging their bonds. For a brief description of the role played by indenture
covenants in corporate debt see infra notes 139–45 and accompanying text. The purpose of the binding
amendments authorized by the tendering holders in their exit consents is to reduce the value of the
existing bonds that non-tendering holders will continue to own, thus incentivizing all holders to tender
(thus agreeing to the amendments). Although exchange offers conditioned on such exit consents have
been used as a substitute for CACs, they do not effectively eliminate the holdout problem and their use
raises a number of potential problems as they are coercive in nature and could be abused by an issuer.
See Antonio E. Bernardo & Eric L. Talley, Investment Policy and Exit Exchange Offers Within
Financially Distressed Firms, 51 J. FIN. 871, 881 (1996) (arguing that managers, acting strategically on
behalf of shareholders, may select inefficient investment projects to enhance their positions against
creditors in a debt-for-debt exit exchange exit-consents offer); Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 31, at
1191 (noting that, due to the TIA, public debt restructurings almost always involve an exchange of new
securities and cash for the original debt); Roe, supra note 33, at 247 (maintaining that an exit consent is
not assured of diminishing the buoying-up effect accompanying the holdout problem).
47
In a prepackaged bankruptcy, the issuer and a majority of bondholders negotiate a restructuring
plan prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If an initial attempt to implement such plan fails, those
minority holders who did not consent will nonetheless be bound once the bankruptcy court, with the
prior approval of two thirds of the bondholders, enters an order binding the entire group to the plan. See
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8) (West 2016). For an overview of procedures involved in a prepackaged bankruptcy see Elizabeth Tashjian, Ronald C. Lease & John J. McConell, Prepacks: An
Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 137–139 (1996) (generally
characterizing pre-packaged bankruptcies as a hybrid form of restructuring with features of a Chapter 11
reorganization and out-of-court workouts). There is evidence that indicates that pre-packaged
bankruptcies may be more efficient than bankruptcy proceedings, but less efficient than private
workouts. See id. at 141–43 (finding that pre-vote prepacks take less time in reorganization and are less
costly); GORDON BERMANT, ARLENE JORGENSEN HILLESTAD & AARON KERRY, CHAPTER 11 VENUE
CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES - REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE
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by these increased costs, a number of scholars have called for the repeal of
the TIA’s prohibition of CACs, arguing that the holdout problem that
complicates private workouts and restructurings can be minimized by the
inclusion of such clauses in trust indentures.48
B. CACs and the Cost of Capital
Whether the benefits of including a CAC (i.e., quicker and less costly
reorganizations that preserve the value of a distressed firm) exceed the
potential costs (i.e., the incentive of issuers to take actions that increase the
chances of a reorganization becoming necessary or to coerce investors in
the course of such reorganization) is likely to hinge on the particular
circumstances surrounding a particular bond offering.49 If the expected
efficiencies in future debt restructurings associated with the inclusion of
CACs in the indenture governing a bond issue outweigh the associated
costs, one could expect to observe a negative correlation between the
presence of a CAC and the interest rate demanded by the investors
purchasing an issuer’s bonds.50
Empirical studies examining the relationship between CACs and
interest rate spreads have yielded mixed results—while some of these
studies have found a price effect associated with the presence of a CAC,
others have found little or no impact.51 In one of the earliest studies,
Tsatsaronis found that spreads for sovereign bonds issued under New York
law (a proxy for the absence of a CAC) had lower spreads than bonds
issued under English law bonds (a proxy for the presence of a CAC),

ADMINISTRATION
OF
THE
BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM
39–40
(1997),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ch11venu.pdf/$file/ch11venu.pdf (noting that the academic
consensus is that pre-packaged cases cost more than out-of-court workouts but less than full Chapter 11
cases).
48
See Carlos Berdejo, Revisiting the Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 89 TUL. L. REV. 541,
598–601 (2015) (proposing a rule where the default is a simple majority, but in which parties can
contract around this default by selecting a higher threshold in their indentures); Robert A. Haugen &
Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital
Structure, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 27, 30 (1988); Roe, supra note 33, at 235, 249, 270–71
(proposing a two-thirds majority voting requirement, excluding insider bonds).
49
See, e.g., Sayantan Ghosal & Kannika Thampanishvong, Does Strengthening Collective Action
Clauses (CACs) Help?, 89 J. INT’L ECON. 68, 68–71 (2013).
50
See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2004). The extent to which the interest would decline will
depend on the relative bargaining power of the issuer and investors as they share the additional surplus.
51
See generally Sönke Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds Whence the Opposition?, 23 J. ECON. SURV. 882 (2009); Sönke Häseler, Trustees versus Fiscal Agents
and Default Risk, 34 EUR. J. L. ECON. 425 (2012) (conducting a meta-analysis and finding no systematic
evidence of either a spread premium or higher actual default rates for bonds with collective enforcement
rights).
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though the difference was not statistically significant.52 A different
conclusion was reached by Eichengreen and Mody who examined corporate
and sovereign emerging market bonds issued under New York and English
laws and found that CACs reduced the cost of borrowing for more
creditworthy issuers but increased it for less creditworthy issuers.53
However, Becker et al. were unable to document such a relationship
between CACs and the creditworthiness of the issuer in their study, finding
that bonds issued under English law (presumably containing CACs) were
characterized by lower spreads, although this effect was not statistically
significant.54 Similarly, in their empirical work, Gugiatti and Richards
concluded that CACs had no economic or statistically significant impact on
bond prices and found no significant differences between the yields of low
and high rated issuers that adopt CACs.55 A more recent set of studies by
Bradley et al. and Bradley and Gulati found that the presence of CACs
reduced the spreads of sovereign bonds, and that this reduction was larger
for less creditworthy issuers.56 In another recent study, Bardozzeti and
Dottori found that the inclusion of CACs reduced the yields of sovereign
issuers with mid-range credit ratings, but had no effect on the yields of the
highest or lowest rated issuers.57
52

Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on Sovereign Bond Spreads, BIS Q.
REV., Nov. 1999, at 22, www.bis.org/publ/r_qt9911.pdf (last visited May 13, 2016).
53
Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114
ECON. J. 247, 249 (2004). To explain this result, the authors argue that while more creditworthy issuers
benefit from the ability of being able to conduct a private workout if it became necessary, less
creditworthy issuers need a unanimity rule as a commitment device to convince creditors of their
willingness to repay and not take unnecessarily risky actions. Id.
54
See Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and
Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L. ECON. 127, 158 (2003). While
Tsatsaroni and Eichengreen and Mody used launch spread data, Becker et al. use secondary market data.
Notably, the authors find that the relationship between CACs and spreads vary through time. In their
1998 data, English law bonds command significantly lower yields than bonds governed by other laws,
an effect which appears to be entirely driven just by high-rated borrowers; however, in their 2000 data,
high-rated borrowers paid a significant yield premium while less creditworthy borrowers were granted a
significant discount and overall, there was no significant relationship between the inclusion of a CAC
and bond spreads. A subsequent study seeks to explain these inter-temporal differences, arguing that
when market sentiment on emerging market debt is poor, all but the most highly rated borrowers are
penalized for the use of CACs; but when investors are enthusiastic about emerging markets, CACs
reduce spreads for all but the least creditworthy issuers. See Barry J. Eichengreen, Kenneth M. Kletzer
& Ashoka Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, 18–24 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03196, 2003).
55
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New
Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L. FIN. 415, 441 (2003).
56
See Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and
Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 310 (2010); Michael
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045, 2046 (2014).
57
See Alfredo Bardozzeti & Davide Dottori, Collective Action Clauses: How do they Affect
Sovereign Bond Yields?, 92 J. INT’L. FIN. 286, 287 (2014). According to the authors this non-linear
relationship is due to the fact that high rated issuers have a low probability of default (thus reducing the
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For someone approaching this question from a corporate finance
perspective, these studies suffer two key methodological limitations.58 First,
the vast majority of these studies have used the governing law of the bond
(namely New York or English law) as a proxy for the presence of a CAC
without reviewing the underlying contractual instruments for each bond
issue. Thus, the variation used in identifying the effect of CACs came
ultimately from variations in the governing law of the instrument, not on the
presence of the clause itself.59 Moreover, the governing law of an
instrument is an imperfect proxy for the presence of a CAC. Bonds issued
under English law, which traditionally has allowed parties to include CACs,
can contain a UAC if they parties so prefer.60 It is true that traditionally
most bonds issued under New York law, including those issued by
sovereign and other international borrowers, did not include CACs.61
However, the TIA ban on CACs does not apply to bonds issued by foreign
governments,62 and bonds issued by foreign corporations are likely to be
exempt from this provision of the TIA to the extent that they are not
publicly offered in the United States.63 Thus, the traditional absence of
CACs in bonds issued by sovereign and other international borrowers under
New York law was the result of a standard developed by the market, which

value of an efficient restructuring) and low rated issuers are suspected of moral hazard to a greater
degree by the market. Id. at 299.
58
By “corporate finance perspective” I refer to the general goal of this Article, which is to
understand how the decision whether or not to include a CAC can affect the cost of capital of companies
from the same country that operate under the same set of laws. Gaining such insight is important not just
in evaluating the recent reforms in Germany and Chile, which mostly affected public debt issued by
corporate issuers in these countries, but also in assessing the economic costs of the existing ban of CACs
under U.S. law and the potential benefits from its repeal. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text
(discussing the German reform), infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean
reform) and supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text (describing the existing U.S. legal regime
governing the use of CAC in public corporate debt).
59
This poses a problem insofar as issuers may have differing reasons to choose a given governing
law and laws will differ in various dimensions (unrelated to the use CACs) which effect may be
confounded with that associated with the adoption of a CAC in any particular transaction. A better
empirical strategy would look at a series of bonds governed by the same law but which differ in their
adoption of CACs. See Bradley & Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone, supra note 56, at
2046, 2073. However, most of this variation in the context of sovereign debt comes from bonds issued
under New York law before and after 2003, thus potentially confounding the effects of CACs with
cross-sectional time trends in sovereign spreads. See infra notes 64 and 67.
60
See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
61
See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
62
TIA § 304(a)(6) exempts bonds issued by foreign governments from its provision. Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 § 304(a)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ddd(a) (West 2016).
63
Offerings exempt under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Rule
144A promulgated thereunder are not subject to the TIA. See Id. § 304(b), § 77ddd(b). For example,
Berdejo finds that in a sample of 25 bonds issued by German corporations during the period 2010–2012
under U.S. law that trade on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, 23 include a CAC. See Berdejo, supra
note 48 at 570.
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in fact recently changed.64 The importance of this imperfect match between
governing law and use or non-use of CACs in sovereign bonds for the
interpretation of the results found in the literature is carefully discussed by
Gugiatti and Richards.65 More recent studies examining the impact of CACs
have sought to address this issue—Bardozzetti and Dottori rely on
Bloomberg’s coding of the absence or presence of a CAC,66 while Bradley
et al. and Bradley and Gulati review offering prospectuses and circulars to
better identify the presence of a CAC.67
Another key limitation of the existing literature is the compositions of
the samples analyzed therein, which mostly or entirely consist of emerging
market sovereign bonds. We should expect CACs to play significantly
different roles in the restructuring of corporate and sovereign debt for a
number of reasons. First, the relevance of the interplay of CACs and issuer
moral hazard in the context of sovereign debt markets is, at least
theoretically, an open question. For example, the presence of the
International Monetary Fund and its interest to launch bailouts to avoid
cross-border financial crises may lead sovereign lenders to believe they are
likely to be paid in full, making the presence of CACs less relevant in
determining spreads.68 This could make CACs less relevant in sovereign
bonds, making differences in the spread of yields of bonds with and without
CACs somewhat uninformative.69 Second, the legal framework that governs
a post-default state of the world is starkly different for corporate and
64

Prior to 2003 nearly all sovereign debt issued under New York law contained UACs. See
generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002). In response to crises in Mexico and Argentina, the
United States Treasury Department recommended that sovereign bonds governed by New York law be
issued under indentures containing CACs for the amendment of payment terms, a recommendation that
was quickly embraced by market participants. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in
Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1649–60 (2006) (discussing the events
surrounding the adoption of CACs in bonds governed by New York law); Sean Hagan, Designing a
Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INTL. L. 295 (2005); Randal Quarles,
Herding Cats: Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2010).
Bradley and Gulati report that while less than 10% of the sovereign bonds issued under New York law
during 1990–2002 include CACs, by 2010, over 90% of all New York-law governed bonds contained
such clauses. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56 at 2049–55.
65
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law
Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 814, 820 (2004). The authors identify almost $12
billion of sovereign bonds issued between 1991 and 2003 that are governed by the laws of New York
but nonetheless contain CACs.
66
See Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at 288.
67
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2055.
68
See Federico Weinschelbaum & Jose Wynne, Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and
Sovereign Debt Markets, 67 J. INT’L. ECON. 47, 49–50. (2005).
69
In fact, there is anecdotal evidence indicating that investors and the market pay very little
attention to CACs when pricing sovereign bonds. See Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in
International Sovereign Bonds, supra note 51 at 905–06.
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sovereign lenders. Holders of bonds issued by sovereigns have little
recourse to a reliable enforcement authority since the courts of a defaulting
sovereign are unlikely to enforce the bondholder’s claim.70 And, given that
there is no bankruptcy-type regime for sovereigns, a sovereign, unlike a
corporate borrower, cannot be liquidated, nor a bankruptcy court mandated
capital restructuring (for example, reducing the principal to be repaid) be
effected at the expense of the equity holders, as in corporate
reorganizations.71
The sample analyzed in this Article addresses these limitations and
presents a unique setting in which the effects of CACs on interest rate
spreads can be analyzed and isolated.72 First, the sample consists entirely of
bonds issued by corporate entities. Thus, the analyses can control for a
variety of issuer characteristics (such as leverage, size, etc.) in addition to
credit rating (the control commonly used in studies of sovereign debt).73
Moreover, indentures for corporate bond issues (unlike those for sovereign
bonds) include a variety of provisions restricting issuer behavior which can
further our understanding of the role of CACs in determining bond
spreads.74 Second, all the corporations that issued the bonds appearing in
the sample are from one country, Chile. This means that the legal and
regulatory framework affecting issuers (e.g., corporate law, securities law,
bankruptcy law, antitrust laws, etc.) is the same for all issuers in the
sample.75 This, of course, is not the case in studies that include issuers from
different countries.

70

Aggrieved bondholders may still bring their claims in the courts of a third country, likely the
United States or the United Kingdom, and try to attach assets owned by the sovereign located abroad –
though it is unlikely they will find any significant assets. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati,
Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). Creditors
may also seek to obtain a judgment that limits the ability of the sovereign to transact in the international
financial markets hoping to coerce the sovereign into repaying. This is the strategy that has been
followed by some of the holders of restructured Peruvian and Argentinean bonds in recent years. See
Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes, supra note 56 at 291–94;
Michael Elaine Moore & Philip Stafford, Argentina in Last-Ditch Manoeuvre to Pay Bondholders, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:41 PM).
71
See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 70 at 11; Steven Schwarcz, The Idiots Guide to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1189 (2004). In addition, corporate issuers have developed alternatives
outside bankruptcy and the use of CACs to restructure their debt. See Bernardo & Talley, supra note 46
and accompanying text.
72
For a description of the sample see infra Part III.B.
73
See infra Part IV.A.1.
74
See infra Part IV.A.3.
75
See supra note 25.
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III. OVERVIEW OF CHILEAN LAW & THE DATASET
A. The Chilean Legal Regime and Reform
The Chilean Securities Market Law (LMVC) sets forth the legal
framework for the issuance of public debt instruments in Chile.76 Debt
instruments issued by non-financial companies with maturities longer than
thirty-six months must be registered with the Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros (SVS), a Chilean administrative agency with duties analogous to
those of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.77 Among
the documents that an issuer must file with the SVS is the contrato de
emision, an agreement between the issuer and the bondholders’
representative that contains the terms and conditions of a bond issue
(hereinafter “indenture”); a prospectus, providing a summary of the terms
and conditions of the instrument; basic information on the issuer; and two
credit rating certificates.78 The contents of the indenture are regulated in
part by the LMVC and by rules promulgated by the SVS, which require
certain provisions and terms to be included therein.79
The process of amending the terms and conditions of a bond issue are
among the items regulated by the LMVC. Under the original version of
Article 125 of the LMVC (Old Article 125), enacted in 1994, changes to
certain core terms, such as the interest rate, principal amount and maturity,
required the unanimous consent of the holders of each and every
outstanding bond.80 Notably, this framework paralleled the one established
in the United States under the TIA.81 Old Article 125 was amended in 2007
to allow CACs in the indentures governing corporate bond issues.82 Under
76

See generally Law No. 18405 art. 103, Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). For an
overview of the Chilean corporate bond market and its development in recent years, see Matias Braun &
Ignacio Briones, Development of the Chilean Corporate Bond Market, in BOND MARKETS IN LATIN
AMERICA: ON THE VERGE OF A BIG BANG? 151 (Eduardo Borenstein et al. eds., 2008).
77
Bonds issued by financial entities must be registered with the Superintendencia de Bancos e
Instituciones Financieras. See Law No. 18405 arts. 103, 131 Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
78
For a discussion of the terms usually included in indentures and the rationales behind these, see
infra note 139 and accompanying text.
79
See Law No. 18405 art. 104 Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
80
See Old Article 125, at par. 3. Bondholders representing at least two-thirds of the outstanding
bonds could authorize amendments to non-core terms of the indenture in a manner binding on all
bondholders, including dissenters. An indenture could provide for a qualified majority greater than twothirds of all outstanding bonds, though not a lower one. See Old Article 125, at par. 1, 4. Bonds held by
the issuer or related persons are not included. See Old Article 125, at par. 2. Old Article 125 was
incorporated to the LMVC by Law 19301 No. 18(b), art. 1, Marzo 19, 1994 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile). See Old Article 125, at par. 1.
81
See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
82
See Law No. 20190 art. 6(8), Junio 5, 2007 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). The legislative history
of the amendments to Article 125 notes the barriers that a unanimity requirement imposes to a debt
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revised Article 125, the terms and conditions of a bond issue may allow
bondholders representing at least 75% of the outstanding aggregate
principal amount to authorize amendments to the interest rate, principal and
maturity of all the bonds governed by such indenture.83 Parties are still free
to include a UAC if they so prefer. 84 If the parties opt to include a CAC, the
indenture may provide for a qualified majority greater than 75% of the
aggregate principal amount outstanding.85
Chile is not the only country to have recently amended the laws
governing the inclusion of CACs in public debt. German law previously
required that significant amendments to the terms and conditions of a bond
be approved by each and every holder.86 A more flexible statute, which
became effective on August 2009, now allows a qualified majority
representing the holders of at least 75% of the aggregate principal amount
outstanding to authorize amendments to the core terms and conditions of a
bond (such as the interest rate, maturity and principal, among others).87
Although the governing document may provide for a higher qualified
majority, it may not provide for one that is lower than 75%.88 As in Chile,
amendments authorized via this mechanism bind all bondholders, including
dissenters.89
Adoption of CACs in corporate bond indentures occurred rapidly in
Chile following the legal reform in that country, a fact that suggests that
market participants welcomed the flexibility afforded by the legal reform.90
However, the fact that CACs are being adopted does not necessarily mean
that their adoption creates value in the underlying transactions.91 If the
restructuring, as well as the need to harmonize the terms of Chilean bonds with those trading in the
international markets where CACs are common. See BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL, HISTORIA
DE LA LEY NÚMERO 20.190,,at 947 (2007) (Chile).
83
See Law No. 18405 art. 125, Octubre 22, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). Bonds held by
the issuer are not counted for purposes of authorizing an amendment via bondholder vote. Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. If the indenture is silent in this regard, any changes to these core terms must be approved by
all bondholders (i.e., as if a UAC had been agreed to). Id.
86
See Jason Grant Allen, More than a Matter of Trust: The German Debt Securities Act 2009 in
International Perspective, 7 CAP. MKT’S. L.J. 55, 61 (2012).
87
See Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [Schuldverschreibungsgesetz –
SchVG] [Debenture Act], Aug. 5, 2009, BGBL I at § 4 (Ger.). For a description of the German
Debenture Act, see Jason Grant Allen, supra note 86; see also Angelo Lercara & Michael Meissner,
Reform of the German Bond Act and its Impact on the German Debt Capital Market, 6 J. INT’L.
BANKING L. & REG. 298, 299 (2010).
88
See Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [Schuldverschreibungsgesetz –
SchVG] [Debenture Act], Aug. 5, 2009, BGBL I at § 5(4) (Ger.). If the governing instrument is silent
with respect to the amendment of core terms, unanimous consent is required for an amendment of such
terms. Id. § 5(1).
89
See Id. § 5(2).
90
See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 560–67. Similarly, adoption of CACs in bonds issued by German
corporations occurred rather rapidly following the reform. Id. at 563.
91
For example, an issuer may use its bargaining power ex ante to negotiate the inclusion of a CAC
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adoption of a CAC does create value for the contracting parties (by, for
example, reducing the expected costs of financial distress), one could
expect to see an effect on the interest rates demanded by the market.92 The
analyses presented in Section III explore the relationship between the
inclusion of CACs and the spread demanded by investors.
B. Description of the Data
The sample analyzed in this Article includes all bonds denominated in
Unidades de Fomento93 with maturities of at least three years issued by
Chilean corporations between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013.94
The SVS website provides certain details for each offering, including the
issue date, effective interest rate (i.e., initial yield),95 term (maturity) of the
planning to use it when it later encounters financial difficulties to coerce creditors into replacing the
original terms with less favorable ones. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 1058–59 (noting that when rights
of bondholders are collective, an issuer may find it easier to coerce bondholders into accepting
detrimental amendments and that therefore individual bondholders may value their ability to control
their own destiny in this regard).
92
The extent to which the interest would decline will depend on the relative bargaining power of
the issuer and creditors as they share the additional surplus. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
93
Bonds may be issued in Chilean pesos (the country’s legal tender) or in Unidades de Fomento
(U.F.’s), an indexed unit of account which is defined relative to the Chilean peso. The U.F. was
introduced in January 1967 to provide an inflation indexed unit of account in which long-term financial
instruments could be denominated. See Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Indexation, Inflation,
and Monetary Policy: An Overview, in INDEXATION, INFLATION, AND MONETARY POLICY 1, 7
(Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel eds., Central Bank of Chile 2002),
http://www.bancocentraldechile.cl/eng/studies/central-banking/pdf/v2/001_018Introduccion.pdf.
The
U.F. is linked to the official consumer price index that measures the true cost of living (i.e. inflation) in
Chile; thus, when obligations are denominated in U.F.’s, their real value remains constant (i.e. they are
held constant in terms of purchasing power). Id. at 5. For an analysis of the experience of the Chilean
U.F., see Robert J. Shiller, Indexed Units of Account: Theory and Assessment of Historical Experience,
in INDEXATION, INFLATION, AND MONETARY POLICY 105 (Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
eds.,
Central
Bank
of
Chile
2002),
http://www.bancocentraldechile.cl/estudios/bancacentral/pdf/v2/105_134Shiller%20.pdf.
94
This
list
is
available
at
http://www.svs.cl/sitio/estadisticas/valores_emision_bonos_corporativos.php. Issuances by financial
companies or companies controlled by the state are excluded.
95
Some studies, such as Bardozzetti & Dottori and Becker et al. use secondary market data (i.e., the
price of the bond in the secondary market) to estimate the yield and spread of the bond. See Bardozzetti
& Dottori, supra note 57, at 288; Becker et al., supra note 39, at 135; see also supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Other studies, such as Eichengreen & Moody and Bradley & Gulati use primary
market data, calculating the yield based on the initial pricing of the bond when originally issued. See
Eichengreen & Moody, supra note 39, at 254; Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2053. This Article
follows the latter approach. In theory, secondary market data can provide an unbiased estimate of the
intrinsic value of bonds with differing issue dates on the same date, facilitating the comparison across
bonds. See Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at 288; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at
2053. However, if markets are illiquid or not otherwise efficient, then secondary market data is less
reliable, a point raised by Bradley and Gulati in the context of sovereign bonds. See Bradley & Gulati,
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bonds, and the aggregate principal amount. I complement this information
by reviewing the corresponding prospectuses for the bond issues in the
sample and the periodic financial reports filed by the issuing companies
with the SVS.96
A review of the prospectuses and indentures reveals whether the bond
is governed by a CAC, as well as any financial restrictions imposed on the
issuer such as interest cover or leverage ratios.97 In addition, as part of its
registration materials, the issuer must obtain a credit rating from two credit
agencies. 98 Companies that have issued securities in the public markets
must file quarterly and annual financial reports with the SVS, which include
the issuer’s total assets and shareholders’ equity, as well as various
measures of the issuers’ leverage, which are described later.99 Following
Bradley & Gulati,100 I calculate the corresponding spread for each bond
issue (the outcome variable of interest), by subtracting from the initial yield
of the bond issue the initial yield on the debt of similar maturity issued by
the Chilean Central Bank during the same calendar month.101
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Assessing the Value of CACs
1. CACs and Interest Rate Spreads
Table 1 provides a set of summary statistics for those bonds issued
between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013 (i.e., during the “post-reform
period” of the sample), including the frequency of CACs and the average
spread for these bonds classified according to whether or not the indenture
supra note 56, at 2053–54. In addition, the when-issued rate (i.e., initial yield) is a more appropriate
measure of an issuer’s actual cost of capital. Id. at 2053.
96
Issuers file quarterly and yearly financial information with the SVS. This information is publicly
available at the SVS website, http://www.svs.cl/sitio/mercados/valores.php.
97
See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
98
Issuers must obtain a credit rating from two registered credit rating agencies and disclose such
rating in the prospectus, as well as in the registration documents. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88,
Octubre 22, 1981 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
99
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
100
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2046.
101
Data on bonds issued by the Chilean Central is available at the historical statistics section of the
Chilean Central Bank website, available at http://www.bcentral.cl/bde/index.htm. Since the Chilean
Central Bank issues bonds in maturities of 5, 10, 20 and 30 years, not all of the bonds in the database
can be perfectly matched to a similar government security. To address this problem, each bond in the
sample is matched to the Chilean government bond with the closest maturity. Bonds with maturities
between 25 and 30 years are matched with the government 30-year bond; bonds with maturities between
15 and 25 years are matched with the 20-year bond; bonds with maturities between 7 and 15 years are
matched with the government 10-year bond; and bonds with maturities less than 7 years are matched
with the government 5-year bond.
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governing a particular bond issue included a CAC.102 Two interesting
patterns emerge from these summary statistics. First, although issuers and
investors have a slight overall preference to include CACs in the indentures
governing bond issues (approximately 54% of the indentures include such
clauses), a sizable minority does not.103 Second, the average spread for bond
issues which include CACs is about 20% lower than the spread for those
issues that do not include such clauses.104 The difference in the average
spread across the two groups of bonds, just over 30 basis points, is
statistically significant at the 1% level. 105 These two results suggest that the
flexibility provided by the new regime is valuable to contracting parties.106

102

Even though parties incorporating a CAC are free to set the qualified majority required to
authorize changes to the core terms at any level between 75% and 100%, all issues that include a CAC
set 75% as the qualified majority. Thus, it is not necessary to distinguish among different levels of
qualified majorities.
103
See infra Table 1, column (1).
104
The average spread for bonds issued with a CAC is 1.1362, while the average spread for bonds
which do not contain a CAC is 1.4430. See infra Table 1, column (2). The median spread for issues that
include a CAC is 24.8 basis points lower than those that do not include such clause (1.1264 for the
former and 1.3841 for the latter), which provides some reassurance that the difference in means is not
being driven by outliers or by multiple issuances by a few companies.
105
The p-value from a two-tailed test that the mean spread for the issues containing a CAC is equal
to the mean spread of issues not containing a CAC is 0.002. See infra Table 1, column (2).
106
For instance, the average effect associated with the inclusion of CAC, a 30 basis points reduction,
represents about 7.5% of the average effective interest rate in the sample, 4.10%. It should be noted that
this interest rate is for the debt denominated in U.F.’s, which are inflation-indexed. If the amounts owed
were expressed in Chilean Pesos, the average interest rate would be higher.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS – BY CAC ADOPTION
(JUL. 2007 – DEC. 2013)
(1)

(2)

Contains
CAC
Yes

Spread
1.1362

(3)
Assets (in
000's P's)
2,440,046

(4)
Debt-Equity
Ratio
1.2533

(5)
Cover
Ratio
7.6513

(6)
Credit
Rating
6.8947

No.
76

No

66

1.4430

2,566,737

1.4677

5.9097

6.803

Difference

0.3067

126,690

0.2144

1.7416

0.0917

p-value

0.0020

0.9079

0.1697

0.125

0.7269

Notes: Column (1) presents the number of bonds issued with and without CACs. The
variable in column (2) is the spread of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the
corresponding bond issued by the Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity. Column (3)
presents the assets of the issuer (in Chilean pesos) as recorded in the issuer’s balance sheet
for the fiscal year preceding the offering. Column (4) presents the debt-equity ratio, defined
as the ratio of total debt to total shareholders’ equity, as these appear in the end of year
balance sheet for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue. The interest cover ratio, i.e., the
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the issuer’s fixed charges (e.g., interest
payments), for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue is presented in column (5). Credit
rating information is presented in column (6) (see supra note 109 for a description of this
variable). The p-values in columns (2)–(6) come from a two-tailed test that the mean of the
corresponding variable for the bond issues containing a CAC are equal to the mean of the
corresponding variable for the bond issues not containing a CAC.

Comparing differences in average spreads to assess the value of CACs
can be misleading since differences in interest rate spreads could be
explained by various issuer characteristics that affect the rate of return
demanded by investors (such as the size and leverage of the issuer), some of
which may also be correlated with the adoption of a CAC. To account for
such characteristics, Table 1 also provides summary statistics on the size
(i.e., total assets), leverage (i.e., debt-equity ratio and interest cover ratio),
and credit rating for those bond issues that include a CAC and those that do
not.107 There is no significant difference in the size of issuers issuing bonds
containing CACs and bonds not containing those clauses.108 Although
issuers including a CAC have on average a better credit rating, the
107

Information about an issuer’s assets, debt-equity ratio and interest cover ratio is obtained from
the financial information furnished periodically by companies with the SVS. See Superintendencia de
Valores y Seguros, supra note 96. Credit rating information is obtained from the registration materials
filed by companies with the SVS when issuing bonds. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88, Octubre 22, 1981
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
108
The difference in the total assets of the companies that issue bonds with and without CACs is
small in magnitude (under 5%) and is not statistically significant. See infra Table 1, column (3).
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difference is small and not statistically significant and, moreover, the
median credit rating is the same across these two groups.109
Issuers including a CAC in their bonds do appear to have lower levels
of debt relative to their assets and income, a fact that could explain some of
the observed difference in spreads across the two groups of bonds. Bonds
containing a CAC are issued by companies having a lower debt to equity
ratio (1.25) than those issuing bonds not containing CACs (1.47).110 This
suggests that bonds containing CACs are issued by companies that have
lower levels of leverage, i.e., that have higher levels of assets relative to
their liabilities. The difference, however, is relatively small and not
statistically significant.111 More notably, bonds containing a CAC are issued
by companies having a higher interest cover ratio (7.65) than those issuing
bonds not containing CACs (5.91).112 This suggests that bonds containing
CACs are issued by companies that generate more earnings relative to the
aggregate annual amount of interest they must pay under their outstanding
debt obligations. Although the difference is not statistically significant, the
relative magnitude is not necessarily trivial.113 However, it is worth noting
that the differences in the median values of the interest cover ratios across
the two groups are substantially lower (5.14 v. 4.83), which suggests that
the difference in the averages may be driven by outliers or multiple
issuances by a few companies.
To examine the relationship between the adoption of CACs and the
credit spread of a bond issue in a manner that controls for the potential
differences in issuer characteristics highlighted above, one can estimate the
following baseline specification:

109

See infra Table 1, column (6). Each bond issue is assigned to a group based on the maximum
rating obtained in the documents presented as part of the offering materials. These credit rating bins are
then assigned a number, with higher values indicating higher rating: AA+ (9), AA (8), AA- (7), A+ (6),
A (5), A- (4), BB+ (3). The median credit rating for both groups is 7 (i.e., AA-).
110
See infra Table 1, column (4). The debt-equity ratio describes the relative proportions of the
assets contributed by the debtholders and equityholders in a company and is commonly used to describe
the leverage of a firm. It is calculated by dividing the issuer’s total liabilities by the shareholders’ equity
(i.e., the company’s total assets minus total liabilities), as both measures appear in the company’s
balance sheet. See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 54 (2d ed.
2010).
111
See infra Table 1, column (4).
112
See infra Table 1, column (5). The interest cover ratio measures the extent to which interest
obligations and other fixed charges are covered by the issuer’s earnings. It is often calculated by
dividing the company’s earnings before interest for a period and taxes by the total amount of interest
payable during that period. See CARNEY, supra note 110, at 55.
113
See infra Table 1, column (5).
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where Spreadi, the outcome of interest, is the difference between the
interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the Chilean
Central Bank with a similar maturity during the same month;114 CACi is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the agreement governing bond issue i
included a CAC; LogAssetsi is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total
assets as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the year preceding
the offering; LogMaturityi is the natural logarithm of the maturity of the
bond; LogPrincipali is the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal
amount the bonds issued; Debt/Equityi is the ratio of total debt to
shareholders’ equity total assets as these appear in the end of year balance
sheet for the year preceding the offering;115 CoverRatioi is the ratio of
earnings before interest and taxes to fixed charges for the issuer in the fiscal
year preceding the offering;116 CreditRatingi is a set of fixed effects based
on the highest of the two credit ratings assigned to issue i in the
corresponding registration statement;117 Yeari is a set of year fixed
effects;118 and εi is an error term.119
114

See Banco Central de Chile, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Yearly financial data for each issuer is available at the SVS website. See Superintendencia de
Valores y Seguros, supra note 96.
116
Id.
117
The issues are assigned to one of the following five groups depending on the highest credit rating
assigned in the corresponding registration statement: AA+ (19 obs.), AA (40 obs.), AA- (24 obs.), A+
(27 obs.), and A and lower (25 obs.).
118
Including year fixed effects allow us to control for any trends in corporate bond spreads which
are driven by macroeconomic factors but that may coincide with the inclusion of CACs in indentures.
This is a concern since CACs could not be adopted by issuers prior to the reform and following the
reform adoption of CACs was initially slower than in later years. See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 561–63
(documenting an increasing trend in the adoption of CACs in the indentures of bonds issued in the years
immediately following the reform in Chile). Thus, if average spreads in the Chilean corporate bond
market significantly decrease throughout the sample, then the coefficient on the CACi indicator variable
may be simply capturing this trend. This, however, does not appear to be the case. The average (median)
spread in the pre-reform period is 0.982 (0.944) while the average (median) spread in the post-reform
period is 1.279 (1.200).
119
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are used in all calculations
of statistical significance throughout the Article. Although the dataset includes a total of 195 bonds,
these are issued by sixty-five different companies. If one does not adjust for the fact that bonds issued by
the same company are likely not to be independent observations the estimated standard errors will
appear to be smaller than they actually are, leading the researcher to erroneously find results to be
statistically significant. One method of dealing with this problem in panel data is to cluster the estimates
of the standard errors by issuing company, which takes into account the covariance between the issues
of a particular company through time when calculating the corresponding standard errors. See Mitchell
A. Peterson, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 435, 457–60 (2009).
115
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The estimates for this baseline specification are presented in column
(1) and column (2) of Table 3. Column (2) presents the results of the
analysis including all 195 bonds in the sample, while the results in column
(1) restrict the sample to the 142 bonds issued in the post-reform period in
the sample. Let us first focus on the subset of bonds issued during the postreform period of the sample (since issuers could not have adopted CACs
prior to the reform). As one can see, the coefficient on CACi is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that the inclusion of a CAC in an
indenture is associated with lower interest rates, even after controlling for
the various issuer characteristics described earlier, including measures of a
firm’s leverage and creditworthiness. The magnitude of this effect is
substantial. The coefficient on the CACi indicator variable, 28.5 basis
points, represents 25.4% of the average spread in the sample of bonds
issued during the post-reform period (112 basis points). 120 The results are
identical for the entire sample of bonds (i.e., if we include bonds issued in
the pre-reform period).121

120

See infra Table 2, column (1).
For the whole sample, the coefficient on CACi indicator variable, 29.1 basis points, represents
24.3% of the average spread in sample (119.8 basis points). See infra Table 2, column (2).
121
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TABLE 2. ADOPTION OF CACS & SPREADS
(1)

(2)
By Issue
Post Reform
All Issues
Issues
CAC
LogMaturity
LogAssets
LogAmount
Debt/Equity
CoverRatio

(3)
(4)
By Issuer-Year
Post Reform
All Issues
Issues

-0.285**

-0.291**

-0.262**

-0.283**

[0.115]

[0.113]

[0.128]

[0.124]

0.0148

0.0201

[0.0497]

[0.0436]

0.0972

0.0935**

0.112*

0.119**

[0.0584]

[0.0451]

[0.0606]

[0.0476]

-0.0609

-0.0591

-0.0906

-0.0725

[0.107]

[0.0807]

[0.0806]

[0.0715]

-0.0307

-0.00876

-0.0132

0.0163

[0.0799]

[0.0704]

[0.1000]

[0.0888]

0.0088

0.004

0.0097

0.0054

[0.0057]

[0.0060]

[0.0065]

[0.0066]

Mean
Outcome
Observations

1.1221

1.198

1.3068

1.2067

142

195

90

126

R-squared

0.438

0.419

0.446

0.451

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) – (2) is the spread
of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the
Chilean Central Bank. In columns (3) and (4) the data is collapsed at the issuer-year level
and the outcome variable is the average spread for each issuer during a given calendar year
weighted by offering size (see supra note 123 for more details). Columns (1) and (3) include
bonds issued between July 1 2007 and December 31, 2013. Columns (2) and (4) include
bonds issued between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013. The explanatory variables
of interest are: (i) CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a the bond agreement governing
issue i included a collective action clause; (ii) LogAssets, the natural logarithm of the issuer’s
total assets for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue, (iii) LogAmount, the natural
logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds issued of issue i; (iv) LogMaturity,
the log of the term of bond i; (v) Debt/Equity, the ratio of total debt to total shareholder
equity as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the fiscal year preceding the bond
issue; and (vi) Cover Ratio, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to fixed charges
for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue. All regressions include a set of year fixed
effects and a set of credit rating fixed effects (see supra note 117 for more details).
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One concern is that these results may be driven by multiple bond
issuances by a few companies.122 To rule out this possibility one can
aggregate the data at the firm-year level by calculating the weighted
average spread during each calendar year for each company by weighing
each bond issue according to its offering size relative to the company’s
other bond offerings in the same calendar year.123 For a firm f that had n
different bond issues in a given year y, the weighted average spread for that
firm-year can be calculated using the following formula:

where Principalfyj is the aggregate principal amount issued in bond
offering j and Spreadfyj is the spread corresponding to bond issue j. 124
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 present the results of specifications
analogous to those presented in columns (1) and (2) using this weighted
average spread as the outcome variable of interest. The estimates for the
coefficient on CACi are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
discussed earlier. In the post-reform portion of the sample, the magnitude of
the CACi coefficient, 26.2 basis points, represents approximately 20.1% of
the mean weighted average spread (1.3068).125 This evidence confirms that
the baseline results are not necessarily being driven by multiple bond
issuances conducted by a few firms.
The results presented thus far, however, must be interpreted with care,
as they do not necessarily establish a causal connection between the
adoption of a CAC and the spread the market demands from an issuer. The
obvious problem is that issuers and investors choose whether or not to
include a CAC in their indenture agreement, raising potential endogeneity

122

The 195 bonds contained in the dataset are issued by sixty-five different companies.
The data can be collapsed in this manner since for every company in the dataset, the values of the
contractual variables considered in these analyses (such as the presence of a CAC or the credit rating of
the issuer) are identical across multiple issuances by the same company in a given calendar year.
Multiple issuances in the same calendar year arise in situations where the issuer simultaneously issues
bonds with different maturities (e.g., one bond with a maturity of ten years and another with a maturity
of twenty-five years), each bond issue being governed in some cases by its own separate indenture.
124
For example, assume that Company A has two offerings in 2010. In the first offering, Company
A issued $100 million dollars in aggregate par value of bonds with a spread of 1.5. In the second
offering Company A issued $50 million dollars in aggregate par value of bonds with a spread of 1.2. The
weighted average spread for Company A in year 2010 would be (100M/150M)*1.5 + (50M/150M)*1.2
= 1.0 + 0.4 = 1.4.
125
See infra Table 2, column (3). The magnitude of the CACi coefficient, 28.3 basis points,
represents approximately 23.4% of the mean weighted average spread in the sample that includes the
pre-reform bonds (1.2067). See infra Table 2, column (4).
123
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concerns.126 The analysis that follow will try to correct for any bias
introduced by these unobserved variables, thus allowing us to establish a
cleaner link between the adoption of CACs and bond spreads.127
2. Correcting for Endogeneity
As just noted, the interpretation of the results presented in Table 2 can
be complicated by the possibility that unobservable characteristics of an
issuer (i.e., variables which are omitted from the analyses presented earlier)
that may be positively correlated with the likelihood of CAC adoption and
negatively correlated with the interest rate spread demanded by investors
are driving the results. 128 The fact that the specifications estimated above
do control for a number of issue and issuer characteristics, such as credit
quality, leverage, size of the offering, term and year of issue, suggests that
such omitted variables are likely not driving the results. To provide further
reassurance, the analyses in this section try to explicitly control for such
unobserved firm characteristics.
One method frequently used to control for the self-selection problem
described above is to include firm fixed effects in the specification, which
will capture any time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the issuer.129
This firm-fixed effect model can be specified as follows:

126

This particular problem is common in empirical studies in the field of corporate finance. See Kai
Li & Nagpurnanandr R. Prabhala, Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE – EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 37, 40 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007)
(“Corporate finance concerns the financing and investment choices made by firms and a broad swathe of
decisions within these broad choices. These choices are not usually random, but are deliberate decisions
by firms or their managers to self-select into their preferred choices.”).
127
The importance of this endogeneity concern for the interpretation of the results ultimately
depends on the question being addressed. The sole goal of these analyses is not necessarily to establish
that randomly assigning CACs across bonds would result in investors demanding a lower spread relative
to those without a CAC (or that forcing market participants to include a CAC would lead to lower
spreads in every transaction). The objective is rather to determine whether affording parties the freedom
to make this contractual choice (as did the Chilean reform) can enhance the value of transactions among
issuers and investors in the public debt markets. One would expect issuers and investors to include a
CAC if they believe that doing so increases the overall value of a particular transaction (e.g., if the
decrease in the expected costs of financial distress outweigh any moral hazard concerns). See, e.g.,
Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 39, at 263. Depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties,
a fraction of this increase in value would then be passed on to the issuer by means of a lower spread.
Thus, observing that (1) some issues include a CAC and (2) that these issues have a lower spread, at the
very least suggests that the contractual choice likely creates value for the parties.
128
See Li & Prabhala, supra note 126.
129
See id. at 56. It should be noted that fixed effects address the endogeneity problem if the
unobservable characteristics are time invariant; if these characteristics are time variant, then the
inclusion of fixed-effects would not fully correct the endogeneity problem described earlier.
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where CACi, LogMaturityi and LogPrincipali are the same variables
described in specification (1); Issuerji is a set of issuer fixed effects;130 and
εi is an error term.131 Since the specification includes firm fixed effects,
variables pertaining to firm characteristics are excluded as these are serially
correlated across observations involving the same firm. The outcome of
interest in specification (2) is AdjSpreadi, which is equal to the spread on
bond i, as defined earlier,132 minus the average spread for all bonds in the
sample that were issued in the same calendar year as bond i. The outcome
variable AdjSpreadi is constructed in a manner that allows us to control for
year to year changes in the average spread demanded by the market from
corporate issuers without having to include year fixed effects, the inclusion
of which would not be advisable given the number of bonds issued by each
company in each calendar year.
In specification (2) the coefficient CACi measures the effect of
including a CAC by relying on within-firm variation in the adoption of
CACs – i.e., for a given firm, it tells us what is the effect of including a
CAC on the spread demanded by the firm’s investors, holding everything
else constant (including observable and unobservable firm characteristics).
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the estimates for all bonds issued by firms
that have two or more bonds in the sample.133 The estimate for the
coefficient on CACi, 21.7 basis points, is quite similar in magnitude to the
baseline estimates presented earlier.134
Since firms could not issue bonds with CACs prior to July 2007 and
130

This set of firm fixed effects consists of a series of dummy variables, each of which is equal to
one for one of the firms in the sample and zero for the other firms. For example, consider Firm A and
Firm B. The variable IssuerAi would be the fixed-effect corresponding to Firm A. In the dataset, the
variable IssuerAi would be coded as one for Firm A and as zero for Firm B. Similarly, the variable
IssuerBi would be coded as zero for Firm A and as one for Firm B. The number of firm fixed effects is
equal to the number of different firms in the sample minus one (i.e., if there are fifty-one firms in the
sample, there would be fifty dummy variables).
131
As in the other specification estimated in this Article, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at the issuer level are used in the calculation of statistical significance. See supra note 119.
132
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
133
There are a total of fifty-one firms with more than one bond in the sample. Bonds issued by firms
that only have one bond in the sample are excluded given the presence of firm fixed effects in the model.
134
See infra Table 3, column (1). The fact that the size of the coefficient is smaller suggests that
some of the differences in spreads across bonds with and without CACs documented in Table 2 were
related to unobservable firm characteristics. It is also worth noting that the results in the model with firm
fixed effects have lower statistical significance. This is due to the limited power that models with fixed
effects have given the fact that they solely rely on intra-firm variation. See Li & Prabhala, supra note
126, at 56.
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the adoption of CACs following the reform increased with the passage of
time,135 one could worry that the coefficient on CACi is merely capturing a
trend in corporate bond spreads across the pre- and post-reform periods. To
address this concern, we can examine changes in the spreads and estimate
the following specification:

Specification (3) is identical to specification (2), but the variable CACi
is replaced by the variable PostReformi, an indicator variable equal to 1 if
bond i was issued after July 1, 2007. If the estimate of the coefficient on
CACi presented in column (1) of Table 3 merely reflected an exogenous
time trend in corporate spreads one would expect the coefficient on
PostReformi to be negative and statistically significant. However, this is not
the case. The magnitude of the coefficient on PostReformi is substantially
smaller than the magnitude of the coefficient on CACi, which was estimated
in specification (2) (0.39 basis points compared to 21.66 basis points), is
close to zero and is not statistically significant. 136 This confirms that the
results presented in column (1) of Table 3 do not merely reflect an
underlying trend unrelated to the adoption of CACs.

135

See Berdejo, supra note 48, at 561–63 (documenting an increasing trend in the adoption of CACs
in the indentures of bonds issued in the years immediately following the reform in Chile).
136
See infra Table 3, column (2).
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TABLE 3. ISSUER FIXED EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS
(JAN. 2005 – DEC. 2013)
(1)
(2)
All issuers with multiple
bonds
CAC

-0.2166*

-0.2159*

[0.114]

PostReform

(3)
Adopters

[0.114]

-0.039
[0.154]

LogMaturity

0.0477

0.0455

0.0104

[0.0421]

[0.0449]

[0.0446]

0.0342

0.0369

-0.0158

[0.104]

[0.105]

[0.178]

No. of Issuers

51

51

12

Observations

181

181

65

R-squared

0.599

0.584

0.477

LogAmount

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) - (3) is the adjusted
spread of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by
the Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity, minus the average spread for all bonds
issued in the same calendar year as bond i. The explanatory variable of interest in columns
(1) and (3) is CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the governing contractual instrument
for bond i contained a collective action clause. In column (2), the explanatory variable of
interest is PostReform, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the issuance of bond i occurred
after July 1, 2007. In addition, columns (1) – (3) include the following explanatory
variables: (i) LogAmount, the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds
issued of issue i and (ii) LogMaturity, the log of the term of bond i. Columns (1) and (2)
include all bonds issued by companies that issued at least two bonds in the sample. Column
(3) includes only those bonds issued by companies that issued bonds with and without
CACs. All regressions include a set of issuer fixed effects.

Another potential concern with the results presented in column (1) of
Table 3 is that it includes bonds issued by firms that never adopted a CAC
in their indentures during the time period covered in the dataset. Given that
the model presented in specification (2) includes fixed effects, including
bonds issued by these firms, contributes very little to the identification of
the effect of the inclusion of a CAC on spreads.137 To address this concern
137

See Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55, at 440–41. The inclusion of bonds issued by these firms
does, however, help calibrate the value for the coefficients on the covariates included in the model (i.e.,
the aggregate principal amount and maturity of each bond issue).
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one can estimate specification (2) relying only on those bonds issued by
firms that do adopt CACs at some point in the post-reform period of the
sample. The resulting coefficient on CACi based on this subset of bonds,
21.6 basis points, is identical to that found in the analysis of the broader
sample and is also similar in magnitude to the coefficient on CACi
presented in the baseline results in Table 2.138
3. CACs and Restrictive Covenants
The results presented thus far indicate that including a CAC in the
indenture governing a bond issue results in lower spreads for the issuer.
However, the mechanism for amending the core terms of a bond is just one
of the many provisions contained in the governing indenture that may affect
the pricing of the underlying bonds.139 To protect themselves, creditors also
include a variety of covenants that curtail the ability of the issuer from
taking certain actions that could jeopardize its liquidity or otherwise
adversely impact bondholders’ interests (e.g., payment of excessive
dividends, claim dilution, and excessive risk-taking, among others).140 A
breach of one of these covenants by the issuer may give creditors the right
to declare a default and accelerate all amounts owed by the borrower (i.e.,
demand the immediate repayment of the principal and matured interest).141
One type of such protective covenant are financial covenants, which
establish certain ratios (typically based on information derived from a
firm’s financial statement) that the issuer must meet periodically (i.e., on a
yearly or quarterly basis). Typically, failure to comply with these ratios then
triggers an event of default under the terms of the indenture.142
138

See infra Table 3, column (3).
In addition to establishing the principal amount, interest, maturity and other payment terms of the
issued bonds, an indenture contains various covenants the issuer must adhere to. Investors in debt
instruments rely on such contractual covenants since for the most part, corporate law provides limited
protection to bondholders, who must worry not only about mismanagement and self-dealing by directors
and officers, but also about shareholder expropriation of creditor wealth (e.g., payment of excessive
dividends, claim dilution, and excessive risk-taking, among others). See Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B.
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19
(1979).
140
In negotiating the strictness of these covenants issuers and investors face a tradeoff – restricting
managerial discretion may limit the opportunistic behavior, but it may also constrain managers from
taking actions that maximize firm value (and reduce the probability of default). See Smith & Warner,
supra note 139, at 118–19. In addition, the breach of a covenant may not be associated with the early
stages of financial distress, leading to unnecessary renegotiations. See Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J.
Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 (2002)
(finding that covenant breaches by debt issuers are common and not necessarily indicative of the
financial distress).
141
See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in Debt
Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2013).
142
The other general type of covenant is a restrictive covenant pursuant to which the issuer promises
139
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Restrictive and financial covenants are more likely to be included (and
be tighter, if included) in situations where investors are concerned about
issuer moral hazard (i.e., the issuer’s incentive or propensity to engage in
inefficient risk-taking).143 Thus, if investors worry that the moral hazard
problem associated with CACs may lead the issuer to undertake riskier
actions that increase the likelihood of financial distress,144 one could expect
financial covenants to be tighter in bonds containing CACs, thus mitigating
the costs associated with such clauses.145 Such systematic differences
between instruments with and without CACs in the structure and content of
these restrictive and financial covenants would add a nuance to the
interpretation of the results presented above. First, tighter financial
covenants, which by restricting the issuer’s ability to take certain actions
reduce the probability of financial distress and non-payment, could explain
in part the lower spread observed in the sample for bond issues containing a
CAC.146 Second, from the issuer’s perspective, the value (or at least
attractiveness) of a CAC is somewhat reduced by the presence of such
tighter covenants, which restrict its abilities to take certain actions and
subject it to continuous monitoring and review by the bondholders.
To verify whether the inclusion of CAC coincides with tighter
financial covenants, I reviewed the relevant sections in the indentures
governing the bonds in the sample to identify the inclusion and structure of
financial covenants. The most common financial covenant is the leverage
ratio, which is present in 114 of the 142 indentures in the post-reform
sample. This type of covenant generally provides that the ratio of total debt
of the company to the company’s total assets (both balance sheet
accounting measures) cannot be higher than a given amount for the
to refrain from taking certain actions (i.e., sell assets or declare a dividend) unless a prescribed set of
conditions is met. Id.
143
Id. at 58–59. In general, financially sound issuers generally face fewer restrictions than their
more risky counterparts. See, e.g., Sattar A. Mansi, Yaxuan Qi & John K. Wald, Debt Covenants,
Bankruptcy
Risk
and
Issuance
Costs,
19–22
(Apr.
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805038; see also Michael Bradley & Michael
Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, 16–21 (May 2004),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466240.
144
See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
145
In other words, there may be an efficient trade-off across contractual provisions: investors may
be acquiescing to the inclusion of CACs (which are valuable to issuers), but asking that in return the
issuer agrees to tighter covenants (which are valuable to investors). The tightness of financial covenants
could also be correlated with the inclusion of a CAC if issuers of bonds containing CACs have qualities
that make the issuer otherwise less risky from the bondholders’ perspective. Thus, if investors agree to
the inclusion of CACs in situations where the issuers are of a “higher quality” (particularly in some
dimension that one cannot observe or measure), then one would expect to see less restrictive covenants
and lower spreads in bond issues containing CACs.
146
However, it is hard to imagine that the tighter financial covenants would outweigh the perceived
additional risk brought by the inclusion of the CAC in a way that results in the observed lower average
spreads.
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previous four fiscal quarters. The second most common financial covenant
is the interest coverage ratio, contained in 42 of the indentures in the postreform sample, which generally provides that the ratio of the earnings of the
company to the company’s total interest payment obligations must be
higher than a given amount for the previous four fiscal quarters. A higher
maximum leverage ratio and a lower minimum interest coverage ratio
provide the issuer with more financial slack. Conversely, a lower maximum
leverage ratio and a higher minimum interest coverage ratio place tighter
restrictions on the issuer.
TABLE 4. FINANCIAL COVENANTS & CAC ADOPTION
(JUL. 2007 – DEC. 2013)

CAC

(1)
(2)
Leverage Ratio
Mean
Median

(3)
(4)
Cover Ratio
Mean
Median

Yes

1.5

1.5

2.712

2.815

No

1.35

1.4

2.5

2.5

Difference

-0.15

-0.212

p-value

0.158

0.092

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present summary statistics on financial covenants prescribing a
maximum leverage ratio, which is present in 114 of the 142 indentures in the post-reform
sample. This type of covenant typically provides that the ratio of total debt of the company
to the company’s total assets cannot be higher than a given amount for the previous four
fiscal quarters. Columns (3) and (4) present summary statistics for financial covenants
prescribing a minimum interest covera ratio, contained in 42 of the indentures in the postreform sample, which typically provides that ratio of the earnings of the company to the
company’s total interest payment obligations must be higher than a given amount for the
previous four fiscal quarters. P-values come from a two-tailed test that the mean threshold
financial ratio for the issues containing a CAC are equal to the mean threshold financial ratio
of issues not containing a CAC.
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Table 4 provides summary statistics for the thresholds associated with
these financial covenants.147 The average prescribed leverage ratio is
slightly lower for bond issues not containing a CAC (1.350) than for those
containing CACs (1.500), which suggests that agreements containing a
CAC actually provide the issuer with more financial slack.148 However, this
difference is not statistically significant and is smaller if one looks at the
median values of the ratios instead.149 On the other hand, the average
prescribed interest cover ratio is higher for issues containing a CAC (2.712)
than for those not containing such clauses (2.500). 150 Although small, the
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.151 This suggests that
firms issuing bonds with CAC face a tighter interest cover ratio covenant;
however given the low number of observations (and inherent self-selection
issues involved), it is difficult to draw any strong inferences.
These small, inconsistent and statistically insignificant differences
between the financial covenants of the bond issues that contain CACs and
those bond issues that do not provide some reassurance that the inclusion of
CACs is not otherwise being accompanied by tighter restrictive covenants
on the issuers. This, in turn, allows us to establish a clearer link between the
adoption of CACs and the resulting lower spreads documented earlier in
this article.
B. CACs & Issuer Credit Rating
The results presented thus far indicate that corporate bonds that
contain a CAC command lower spreads than bonds not containing such
clauses, thus lowering the cost of capital for those firms able to issue bonds
incorporating CACs. This link between CACs and yield spreads was
documented for the entire sample of bonds, which includes bonds of
varying credit quality.152 Notably, several of the existing studies in this area
have not found such a relationship to exist across the entire spectrum of
bonds, finding that while CACs lower the spread for some issuers, they

147

The data is presented at the bond issue level. The results are qualitatively similar if the data is
aggregated at the issuer-year level – the differences across groups is actually slightly smaller. The data
can be collapsed in this manner since for every company in the dataset, the values of the contractual
variables considered in these analyses (i.e., the presence of a CAC and the financial covenants) are
identical across multiple issuances by the same company in a given calendar year. See supra note 123
and accompanying text.
148
See infra Table 4, column (1).
149
The median prescribed leverage ratios for indentures that contain a CAC is 1.50, while the
median for those that do not contain a CAC is 1.40. See infra Table 4, column (2).
150
See infra Table 4, column (3).
151
The difference in the median prescribed interest cover ratios between indentures that contain a
CAC (2.815) and those that do not (2.500) is slightly larger. See infra Table 4, column (4).
152
See supra Part IV.A.1.
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increase it for others.153 Whether higher or lower credit quality issuers can
benefit the most (or even at all) from the adoption of a CAC is therefore an
open question in the literature.154
Theoretically, it is not clear whether low or high credit quality issuers
should benefit the most from adopting CACs in their bond agreements (at
least in a way that affects the interest rate spread). As noted earlier, in
deciding whether or not to include a CAC, contracting parties will balance
the benefits (e.g., quicker and less costly reorganizations) against the costs
(e.g., issuer moral hazard).155 To the extent that less creditworthy issuers are
more likely to run into financial difficulties in the future, one would expect
them to benefit more from the flexibility that CACs would afford in the
event that they need to restructure their debt. On the other hand, riskier
issuers may be more likely to engage in activities that increase the prospects
of becoming financially distressed, especially if they are already
overleveraged.156 Arguably, in this sense, higher credit quality issuers pose
less risk, but can still benefit from the flexibility provided by CACs.
In the next set of analyses, the bond issues in the sample are divided
into two groups based on the highest credit rating furnished as part of the
registration statement filed with the SVS.157 One group contains the bond
issues for which the highest credit rating was AA or higher; the other group
includes the bond issues for which the highest credit rating was AA- or
lower.158 This particular cut-off was chosen because it is the one that
divides the sample most evenly into two groups. In the entire sample, 104
153

Eichengreen and Mody’s estimates indicate that the inclusion of CACs increase the spread for
lower rated sovereign issuers, but decreases them for higher rated issuers. Eichengreen & Mody, supra
note 39, at 256–59. Becker et al. find a similar relationship in one of the time periods they study, but in
another time period find the opposite relationship (i.e., CACs increase the spread for higher rated
sovereign issuers, but decreases them for lower rated issuers). Becker et al., supra note 39, at 139–43.
Bardozzetti and Dottori find that CACs decrease yield spreads for issuers in the middle of the credit
rating distribution, but not for those at the top or the bottom. Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 57, at
287–89. Bradely and Gulati also document differing effects of CACs on the spreads of low and high
rated issuers. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2079–86. Another study that finds similar effects of
CACs for low and high rated issuers found no effect at all for either. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 55,
at 436–43.
154
And, as noted earlier, these studies have focused on sovereign bonds, devoting minimal—if
any—attention to corporate bonds. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
155
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
156
The creditor-shareholder conflict becomes more pronounced when issuers are highly levered, as
shareholders have greater incentives to undertake certain risky and value destroying activities. See Smith
& Warner, On Financial Contracting, supra note 139, at 153–54.
157
Firms issuing bonds must obtain two credit ratings, which are submitted as part of the registration
materials filed with the SVS. See Law No. 18405 arts. 76, 88, Octubre 22, 1981 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile); supra note 98 and accompanying text.
158
Although higher rated issuers are more likely to adopt a CAC (55.7%) than their lower credit
quality counterparts (51.9%), the difference is small and not statistically significant (the p-value from a
two-tailed test that the average CAC adoption rate for high rated issuers is equal to the adoption rate of
low rated issuers is 0.6486).
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of the bonds have a credit rating of AA- or lower while 91 have a credit
rating of AA or AA+; while in the post-reform period of the sample, 81 of
the bond issues belong to the low credit rating group, while 61 belong to the
high credit rating group. 159
One can then estimate the baseline specification (1) separately on each
subset of issuers (though excluding credit rating fixed effects).160 The
results for these specifications, which are presented in Table 5, strongly
suggest that both high and low rated issuers benefit in a similar manner
from the inclusion of a CAC in the indentures governing their bonds. Let us
focus on the subset of bonds issued in the post-reform period. For issuers in
the high credit rating group, the coefficient on CACi, -0.245, represents
about 23% of the average spread in that subset of the sample and is
statistically significant.161 Similarly, for lower rated issuers, the coefficient
on CACi, -0.372, represents about 26% of the average spread in that subset
of the sample.162 The results are qualitatively similar if we include the
bonds issued in during the pre-reform period portion of the sample.163

159

Determining which credit rating to use and establishing a cut-off (or cut-offs) to divide the
sample into two (or more) groups is to some extent arbitrary. In fact, many of the existing articles
examining the effects of CACs on the yield spreads of sovereign bonds have used different cut-offs. See
Häseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds, supra note 51, at 901.
160
This is the method followed by Bradely and Gulati in measuring the differing effects of CACs on
the spreads of low and high rated sovereign issuers. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 56, at 2079–86. One
could also estimate a single specification which includes an interaction term between the CAC indicator
variable and the credit quality indicator variable. However, estimating a single specification with an
interaction term may not be the most suitable method to measure the different effects that adopting a
CAC has on the interest rate spreads demanded by investors from issuers of high and low credit quality.
Such a joint model would be appropriate if we expected only the inclusion of a CAC in the indenture to
interact with the creditworthiness of the issuer in determining the interest rate spread. However, some of
the other covariates in the model (such as the issuer’s leverage) may also interact with the
creditworthiness of the issuer in determining the resulting spread demanded by the market. A single
specification would force the coefficient on all these other covariates to be the same for low and high
credit quality issuers.
161
See infra Table 5, column (1).
162
See infra Table 5, column (2).
163
For issuers in the high credit rating group, the coefficient on CACi, -0.302, represents about
29.8% of the average spread in that subset of the sample and is statistically significant. Similarly, for
lower rated issuers, the coefficient on CACi, -0.376, represents about 27.6% of the average spread in that
subset of the sample. See infra Table 5, columns (3) and (4).

505

36_3_1_BERDEJO FINAL.docx (Do Not Deete)

10/10/16 8:20 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

36:469 (2016)

TABLE 5. ADOPTION OF CACS, CREDIT QUALITY, AND SPREADS
(1)
(2)
Post Reform Issues
High
Low
Rating
Rating

(3)
All Issues
High
Rating

(4)

-0.245**

-0.372*

-0.302***

-0.376*

[0.106]

[0.217]

[0.110]

[0.214]

0.0181

-0.0267

0.0326

-0.0386

[0.0600]

[0.0689]

[0.0539]

[0.0626]

0.0892

-0.0088

0.106*

0.0137

[0.0777]

[0.0975]

[0.0597]

[0.0809]

-0.0447

-0.113

-0.0844

-0.0415

[0.106]

[0.159]

[0.0882]

[0.118]

0.2630*

-0.0254

0.2130**

-0.0323

[0.134]

[0.104]

[0.101]

[0.103]

0.0054

0.0000

0.0009

-0.0024

[0.0062]

[0.0105]

[0.0074]

[0.0101]

Mean
Outcome

1.0842

1.4254

1.0120

1.3608

Observations

61

81

91

104

R-squared

0.498

0.273

0.417

0.278

CAC
LogMaturity
LogAssets
LogAmount
Debt/Equity
CoverRatio

Low
Rating

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level in brackets (* significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome in columns (1) - (4) is the spread
of issue i, defined as the interest rate on bond i and the corresponding bond issued by the
Chilean Central Bank with a similar maturity. Columns (1) and (2) include bonds issued
between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013. Columns (3) and (4) include bonds issued
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013. Columns (1) and (3) restrict the analyses
to issues that obtained a credit rating equal or higher than AA-. Columns (2) and (4) restrict
the analyses to issues that did not obtain a credit rating equal or higher than AA-. The
explanatory variables of interest are: (i) CAC, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a the bond
agreement governing issue i included a collective action clause; (ii) LogAssets, the natural
logarithm of the issuer’s total assets for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue, (iii)
LogAmount, the natural logarithm of the aggregate principal amount the bonds issued of
issue i; (iv) LogMaturity, the log of the term of bond i; (v) Debt/Equity, the ratio of total debt
to total shareholder equity as these appear in the end of year balance sheet for the fiscal year
preceding the bond issue; and (vi) Cover Ratio, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes
to fixed charges for the fiscal year preceding the bond issue. All regressions include a set of
year fixed effects.
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The evidence thus indicates that all issuers, regardless of their credit
rating, can benefit from the inclusion of CACs, namely lower interest rates.
This result contrasts with the results documented in earlier studies in which
CACs are found to generally benefit only a subset of issuers.164
V. CONCLUSION
The enabling structure of corporate law generally allows parties to
contract freely in order to promote their best interests, leading to socially
optimal arrangements.165 This precept should be particularly true in the
context of corporate bonds, which are governed by complex, negotiated
indentures and are purchased and held by large, sophisticated investors.166
Despite these market realities, the regulation of the terms and conditions of
public corporate debt in a number of countries has traditionally contained
numerous mandatory rules, including prohibitions on the inclusion of
CACs. Some countries, such as Chile and Germany, have recently repealed
pre-existing legal restrictions on the use of CACs.167 However, the laws in
other countries, most notably the United States, continue to prohibit the use
of CACs.168 The evidence presented in this Article strongly suggests that a
164

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate On Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’
structure of corporate law.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History in Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444–49 (2001); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the
Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1544 (1989); Roberta Romano,
Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1599, 1615–16 (1989); Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, What We Can Learn From Other
Statutory Schemes: Freedom And Its Limits In The Delaware General Corporate Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 845, 860 (2008).
166
See Roe, supra note 33, at 277–79 (asserting that the protection of individual investors through
the voting prohibition needs to be reconsidered in light of the current situation where institutional
investors hold most public debts); Schwartz, supra note 33 at 631–32; Kahan, supra note 36, at 1060–
62. The concentrated and sophisticated nature of modern institutional intermediaries, particularly in the
public credit markets, also makes it unlikely that bondholders will be taken advantage of, as was feared
at the time when the TIA was drafted and enacted. See Roe, supra note 33, at 277–79 (asserting that the
protection of individual investors through the voting prohibition needs to be reconsidered in light of the
current situation where institutional investors hold most public debts). Historically, Section 316(b) of the
TIA was adopted as a response to the financial crises of the 1930s resulting from the Great Depression
and was aimed at preventing out-of-court debt restructurings from being forced upon minority
bondholders by corporate insiders (such as large shareholders or banks) seeking to further their own
interest at the expense of the (possibly uninformed) minority bondholders. See Eichengreen & Mody,
supra note 39, at 250 n.2; Schwartz, supra note 33, at 631–32; and George W. Shuster, The Trust
Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 437 (2006).
167
See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the German reform), supra notes 80–
83 and accompanying text (discussing the Chilean reform).
168
See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
165
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mandatory prohibition of CACs is misguided public policy and, more
generally, informs the general debate surrounding the use of CACs in
sovereign and corporate debt where allowed by applicable law.
The recent legal reform in Chile, which repealed a preexisting ban on
CACs, has yielded measurable economic effects as contracting parties have
embraced the flexibility of the new regime. Bonds issued with a CAC after
the reform have spreads that are, on average, 20% lower than those bond
issues that do not include such clauses.169 The existence of this negative
correlation between the inclusion of a CAC and the interest rate spread of a
bond suggests that issuers and investors are adopting CACs in transactions
where their inclusion results in optimal, more efficient arrangements that
create economic value. The average effect, 28.5 basis points, translates to
annual interest savings of over U.S. $415,000 for the average offering
which add up to approximately U.S. $6.0 million during the life of the
average bond in the sample.170
Generally, these findings inform a number of ongoing debates
surrounding the use of CACs. First, they provide a positive assessment of
the recent legal reforms in Chile and Germany which repealed existing bans
on the use of CACs in corporate debt. From a practical standpoint, the
results suggest that corporate issuers and investors should strongly consider
the inclusion of CACs in the instruments governing their bonds when
allowed by applicable law and provide additional support for the inclusion
of CACs in sovereign debt, an issue that has recently received much
attention. From a policy perspective, the experience in Chile provides
further support for the repeal of the longstanding ban on CACs for
corporate bonds issued under U.S. law, a repeal that would result in lower
interest rates, thereby reducing the cost of capital for issuers and fomenting
economic growth.171

169

See supra Part IV.A.1.
This result is robust to including various controls for issuer characteristics and is replicated in
specifications that include issuer fixed-effects, confirming that these results are not driven by
unobservable variables. See supra Part IV.A.2. In addition, the evidence indicates that including a CAC
can potentially benefit all issuers regardless of their credit rating. See supra Part IV.B.
171
For a brief description of some of the proposed modifications to the TIA, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
170
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